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Abstract: This paper examines empirically the interest rate-exchange rate
link in the context of the Mexican experience with a floating exchange
regime. The impulse response function derived from an ECM estimated
by GMM reveals a lasting positive effect of a currency depreciation on
the peso-dollar interest rate differential. Some of the macroeconomic
consequences from this pattern are discussed, together with a possible
explanation based on the incorporation of the central bank reaction
function into private expectations.
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Resumen: Este artículo examina empíricamente el nexo tasa de
interés-tipo de cambio en el contexto de la experiencia de México con un
régimen de flotación cambiaria. La función de impulso respuesta derivada
de un modelo de corrección de errores (ECM) estimado por GMM revela
la existencia de un efecto positivo persistente de una depreciación
cambiaria sobre el diferencial peso-dólar de tasas de interés. Se discuten
algunas de las consecuencias macroeconómicas de este patrón, y se
presenta una posible explicación basada en la incorporación de la función
de reacción del banco central en las expectativas del sector privado.
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n an early example of what would later become a trend, Mexico
abandoned its official exchange rate band against the U.S. dollar in
December of 1994. Preserving the system had become increasingly
difficult on account of both a steady process of real currency
appreciation and the impact of major political shocks. Eventually, these
developments led authorities to devalue the band ceiling in about 20%,
but, as is well known, the policy decision backfired and a major financial
crisis ensued. Different interpretations for this seemingly perverse
market reaction exist, including the possibility that the initial
devaluation was to small to correct for the inherited real appreciation
(see Dornbusch et al., 1995), and that the realignment acted as a focal
point for expectations of an imminent default on dollar-indexed
Tesobonos (see Ros 2001, Ibarra 1999).
The loss of international reserves intensified in the wake of
devaluation and as a result the Banco de Mexico rapidly came to a
situation in which it was no longer able to defend a target level for the
exchange rate. This fact precipitated a forced shift into a floating
regime. Initially, floatation was adopted as a strictly transitory
arrangement, under the premise that it was the only viable option in
a situation characterized by very unstable exchange rate expectations
and depleted international reserves. Contrary to the early official
statements, though, the floating regime has evolved into a rather solid
component of the country’s overall monetary framework (for a detailed
account, see Carstens and Werner 1999).
So far, the flexible exchange rate regime has survived a number
of major shocks, including the Russian debt default of 1998, the
currency crises in Asia (1997), and in Brazil (1999), wide fluctuations
in oil prices, and the country’s political transition in 2000. At the
same time, the inflation rate has fallen from a 52% peak in
December of 1995 to about 5% in 2002, while the output growth
rate remained moderately high until the recent world deceleration.
This record has certainly been a plus for the system. Demonstrating
that disinflation is possible under a fluctuating exchange rate
regime has, in particular, been a major achievement for this
developing country.
Furthermore, given the recent world economic experience, the
discouragement of major speculative attacks against the currency
may be, in practical terms, a good enough reason to keep the7
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float.1 But it is also possible to judge the regime’s performance
according to other conventional criteria. For instance, it is
interesting to note that the current system has not eliminated the
phenomenon of recurring periods of real currency appreciation.2 It
can also be noted that the volatility of both the exchange rate and
the interest rate increased after the regime shift, in contrast to the
prediction of traditional theory.3 In a sense, this is not surprising:
as recent empirical research has shown, actual floats tend to diverge
from the textbook model in ways that make it difficult to distinguish
between de jure floats and heavily managed exchange rate regimes
(see Calvo 2000, Calvo and Reinhart 2002, and Hausmann et al.
1999 and 2000).
In terms of macroeconomic management, one of the potential
benefits of a floating exchange regime is that it may allow a country to
have an autonomous monetary policy despite being in an environment
of high international mobility of capital; this stands in contrast to the
case of a fixed exchange rate system, in which the international
equalization of returns forced by arbitrage entails the equalization of
local and foreign currency interest rates (up to some risk premium).
The possibility of having an autonomous monetary policy depends
crucially, however, on the way interest rate differentials respond to
exchange rate changes. In this regard, it is conventionally assumed
that an exogenous rise in the exchange rate (a decline in the value of
the local currency) should lead to a fall in the expected depreciation
rate, and thus, through arbitrage, a fall in local interest rates. This
opens the possibility of a trade-off between the levels of the exchange
rate and the interest rate that can be exploited by monetary policy.
This kind of link has also the implication that a float may exhibit
1 This idea underlies much of the recent debate on the so-called “two corners” approach to
the choice of exchange rate regime in developing countries. See Edwards (2001) for an overview.
2 As shown by the 33% increase in the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) moving-
average index of dollar unit labor cost in the manufactures, between January 1998 and December
2002. On the other hand, the most recent record (as of early 2003) indicates that, with the float,
the eventually necessary upward adjustment in the exchange rate has been much less disrupting
than what was observed in previous episodes featuring a fixed or predetermined rate (although
the overall macroeconomic setting has also been more favorable).
3 The exchange rate’s average monthly change (in absolute terms) moved from 1.02% during
January 1992-December 1994, to 1.51% during January 1996-October 2001. At the same time,
the average change for the real interest rate increased from 1.2 percentage points to 2.15 points
(see Ibarra 2002). Martínez et al., (2001) show that, although the volatility of the peso’s exchange
rate has been similar to that of other major floaters, interest rate volatility has been much
higher, even after excluding 1995 data from calculation. The same conclusion emerges from
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) data.8
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automatic output stabilizing properties in the presence of capital
account shocks, as explained below.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the actual way interest
rate differentials have reacted to variations in the exchange rate during
the floating regime currently in operation in Mexico. This is done by
means of an Error Correction Model (ECM) for the interest rate gap
between Mexican and US Treasury bills. The model is estimated by
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to allow for the possible
endogeneity of regressors. As it turns out, the estimation results show
a positive correlation between current exchange rate changes and
future variations in the interest rate differential.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section
considers in more detail the macroeconomic implications of the interest
rate-exchange rate link, providing motivation for the empirical
analysis, and also an analytical framework to appreciate the main
implications from the econometric results. The estimation results from
the ECM for the peso-dollar interest rate differential are presented in
section II together with the estimated impulse response function that
describes the differential’s dynamic response to a permanent change
in the peso-dollar exchange rate. Section III considers a possible
explanation for the findings, while section IV concludes with a
summary of results.
I. Macro effects of the interest rate-exchange rate link
Consider the textbook case of an individual deciding whether to buy a
peso- or alternatively a dollar-denominated bond with the same
maturity. The return (in local currency) for the first option would be
the current peso interest rate: i, while in the latter it would correspond
to the sum of the dollar interest rate and the peso’s expected
depreciation rate against the dollar: i*+ e. In this context, the expected
depreciation rate is equal to the proportional change in the present
exchange rate expected for the length of the bond holding period.
Under conditions of high capital mobility, arbitrage ensures the
existence of a strong link between the return on the two assets. Thus,
it is possible to write an equilibrium condition of the form:
(1) i = i* + e + d,9
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where d is by definition an equilibrium return differential or risk
premium. With perfect capital mobility, d will be zero and (1) will
simplify to the (uncovered) interest parity condition.
A floating exchange regime will allow a country to have an
autonomous monetary policy, despite the equalization of returns
forced by the international mobility of capital and for a given level
of the risk premium, by adjustments in the expected depreciation
rate. Assume the authorities adopt an expansionary policy stance,
say through an open market purchase of peso bonds. The peso
interest rate will tend to fall, thus creating an excess demand for
dollars; if the authorities do not intervene in the exchange market,
this excess demand will result in a weakened currency (an exchange
rate rise).
The key point is how this currency depreciation would restore
equilibrium condition (1). A standard assumption in the analytical
literature is that the exchange rate rise reduces the gap between the
current rate and the level of the exchange rate expected for some future
period, thus bringing about the required fall in the expected
depreciation rate. The reasoning implicitly assumes that the expected
exchange rate is independent of the current rate (or that, if it moves,
it does so less than proportionally). This is, for instance, the mechanism
in Dornbusch’s classic 1976 model: a permanent monetary expansion
increases the expected exchange rate in the same proportion, and thus
the exchange rate has to overshoot in the short run to restore asset
market equilibrium.4
Thus, for a given level of the risk premium, an autonomous
monetary policy is possible because the rise in the exchange rate
reduces depreciation expectations and this tends to lower the local
currency interest rates. The prediction is that there should be a
negative relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate.
To further appreciate the macroeconomic role of this link, consider
the case of a capital account shock. In particular, assume that there is
an exogenous fall in the world demand for local bonds. The ensuing
capital outflow in the balance of payments will tend to depress domestic
output, while the reduced demand for local assets will weaken the
4 If there is a high degree of capital mobility, but domestic and foreign assets are imperfect
substitutes, then in general d will be different from zero, and its size will be positively affected
by the relative supply of peso assets. This creates the possibility of a second adjustment
mechanism. The central bank’s purchase of bonds will reduce the stock of peso bonds available
to the private sector, exerting in this way downward pressure on the risk premium.10
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currency.5 Note, however, that if today’s currency depreciation leads
to a lower expected depreciation rate, then interest rates (except
perhaps those for very short-term instruments) will fall, tending to
offset the contractionary output effect of the capital account shock.
The automatic output stabilizing mechanism will not work, of
course, if after a currency depreciation the interest rate differential
fails to decline (e.g., because of an adjustment in risk assessments or
expectations of future public policies —as explored in Section 4); it
may even increase, in which case the output effect of the capital account
shock would be reinforced.6 In such case, the conduct of monetary
policy would also be made more complicated. In particular, if a currency
depreciation is not able to restore asset market equilibrium (Equation
1) at a lower peso interest rate, then a counter-cyclical policy response
to the capital account shock could destabilize financial markets.
II. Empirical analysis
Having briefly discussed the macroeconomic role of the interest
rate-exchange rate link in financially open economies, this section turns
to an empirical analysis of the recent Mexican experience. In particular,
it presents estimation results for the dynamic response of peso-dollar
interest rate differentials to a permanent variation in the peso-dollar
exchange rate. The analysis uses weekly interest rate data on Mexican
and US Treasury bills since June of 1996. The impulse response
function is derived from an error correction model estimated by GMM.
a) Description
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the interest rate differential between
Mexican and US Treasury bills from January 1996 through July 2002,
5 Current work on the conduct of monetary policy and the choice of exchange rate regime
in developing countries is giving increasing attention to this type of shock, prompted by the
substantial increase in the volume and volatility of private international capital flows witnessed
recently. See, for instance, Hausmann and Rojas-Suárez (1996) and Eichengreen (2001).
6 Casual observation of this type of relationship led Calvo (1997), for instance, to conclude
that the conduct of monetary policy in Mexico suffered from lack of credibility. Eichengreen and
Hausmann (1999) argue that the positive contemporaneous correlation between interest rates
and the exchange rate in Mexico can be explained by the reluctance of authorities to follow anti-
cyclical policies in a context of currency and maturity mismatches in the banking sector.11
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together with the rates of inflation and currency exchange (pesos per
dollar; the series are precisely defined below, in Subsection IIc). There
are two important observations to make: the first is that the interest
rate differential is strongly trended, and that the trend appears to be
determined by the inflation rate (with transitory departures caused
by phenomena such as the Russian crisis of August 1998). In terms of
Equation (1), this observation suggests that, in the long run, the
expected depreciation rate is determined by the domestic inflation
rate, perhaps because expected inflation is, to an important extent,
determined by current inflation.
Figure 1. Interest rate differential, and inflation and exchange rates.
interest rate differential 
inflation rate 
exchange rate (rhs scale) 
A second feature to note is the strong positive contemporaneous
correlation between the interest differential and the exchange rate,
presumably as a reflection of the presence of capital account shocks.7
In this case, an exogenous rise in the world demand for peso assets,
for instance, would simultaneously strengthen the currency and push
local interest rates down. This observation implies that any possibility
of finding a negative relationship will depend on including a long lag
7 It may be important to note that during this period the domestic interest rate under
study was not a direct instrument in the Banco de Mexico’s policy rule, but a market-determined





























structure in the regression analysis (an aspect that Equation 1 does
not explicitly capture). It could very well be that in the very short run
a rise in the exchange rate leads to higher interest rates, but that over
time this bandwagon effect loses strength, and eventually a fall in
expected depreciation lowers interest rates.
b) Specification
As could be expected, for most of the series under analysis it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis that they contain a unit root. Thus,
the econometric analysis will proceed in two steps, the first being the
estimation of a cointegration equation from an autoregressive
distributive lag (ADL) model for the level of the interest rate
differential; the second step involves the estimation of an ECM in
differences, from which an impulse response function for the interest
differential can be derived.
Our purpose is to estimate the dynamic response of private
expectations and risk assessments,8 as reflected in the evolution of
the peso-dollar interest rate differential, following a permanent rise
in the exchange rate. This differential may of course also reflect
monetary policy actions that affect asset supplies and local liquidity
conditions. Thus, the regression equation includes, as a control variable,
an index of the real money supply divided by a measure of economic
activity; it also includes the inflation rate as the main determinant of
the trend interest differential, and the Federal funds rate as an
indicator of the US monetary policy stance.
The starting point for the estimation of the cointegration equation
was the following ADL model for the interest rate differential:
(2)   irdt = a0 + S aj irdt–j + S bi lnst–i + S ci lnmt–i + S fi pt–i + S gi fedt–i + vt,
where j = 1, 2, …, L, i = 0, 1, …, L, L is the number of lags included in
the equation, t denotes the week, irdt–j the interest rate differential,
lnst–i the log exchange rate, lnmt–i the log adjusted real money base,
pt–i the annual inflation rate, fedt–i the Fed funds rate, and vt an error
8 Berg and Borensztein (2000) discuss why a country’s political risk premium may be
positively correlated with expected depreciation, and illustrate with data from Argentina. See
also Edwards (2001), Figure 4.13
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term.9 The long-run equilibrium, or cointegration, version of Equation
(2) is obtained by imposing the condition that each variable has
converged to a constant value, i. e., irdt= irdt–j for all j, etc.
Equation (2) was estimated in the following transformed, fully-
equivalent version:
(3) irdt = a0 + a irdt–1 – S ak (irdt–1 – irdt–k) + b lnst – S bj (lnst – lnst–j) + c lnmt
– S cj (lnmt – lnmt–j) + f pt – S fj (pt – pt–j) + g fedt – S gj (fedt – fedt–j) + vt,
where k = 2, …, L. It is easy to verify that estimation of this transformed
version necessarily satisfies: a = Saj, b = Sbi, c = Sci, f = Sfi, and g = Sgi.
One advantage of estimating Equation (3) instead of the original
version is that it immediately yields the coefficients forming the long-
run relationship (another is that it generates the p-values for the
long-run coefficients; see Davidson and McKinnon 1993, chapter 19).
In particular, the cointegration equation will be given by:
(4) irdt
c = a0/w + (b/w) lnst + (c/w) lnmt + (f/w) pt + (g/w) fedt,
where w =1 – a . In any given period, the deviation from long-run
equilibrium will simply be: ut = irdt – irdt
c. According to the so-called
residual-based test, if Equation (4) is indeed a cointegration equation,
then we should be able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in
the ut series (see Enders 1995, chapter 6).
The dynamic response of the interest rate differential to an
exchange rate change was obtained by means of an impulse response
function. The starting point was again an ADL model for the interest
differential, but this time specified in differences and including the
9 Equation (1) is mainly a theoretical relationship stating that under free capital mobility
similar assets must offer similar rates of return, up to a risk premium. Equation (2), in
contrast, is a specification intended for empirical examination. In moving from Equation (1)
to (2), there are two features that must be considered: first, in time series analysis it is
common practice to include lagged values of both the dependent variable and the regressors,
in order to account for the purely statistical properties of the data (so as to avoid, for instance,
a potential problem of serial correlation in the residuals) and the probable protracted impact
of the regressors on the variable under study. The second feature is that it surely would be
an unrealistic assumption to posit that there is perfect capital mobility between the US and
Mexico; under imperfect mobility, the interest parity condition does not hold exactly, and
there can be a risk premium affected by variables such as those included in the right side of
Equation (2), namely, the local money supply, the inflation rate, and the foreign interest
rate.14
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short-term deviation from equilibrium as a regressor.10 The resulting
ECM is:
(5)  Dirdt = D ut + h0 + S hj Dirdt–j + S ni Dlnst–i + S pi Dlnmt–i + S wi Dfedt–i + ut,
where D is the coefficient of the short-run deviation from equilibrium.
The dynamic response of the interest differential to a permanent rise
in the log exchange rate was derived from the estimated coefficients
of Equation (5). In particular, the points on the impulse response
function correspond to the (total) derivative of Dirdt+r with respect to
Dlnst, for r = 1, 2, … (see Enders 1995, chapter 1). For instance, the
first three points were calculated as:
dDirdt/dDlnst = n0
dDirdt+1/dDlnst = n0 + n1 +h1 (dDirdt/dDlnst)
dDirdt+2/dDlnst = n0 + n1 + n2 + h1 (dDirdt+1/dDlnst) + h2 (dDirdt/dDlnst)
where it is assumed that the variation in the exchange rate is
permanent (i.e., dDlnst+r = dDlnst, for r = 1, 2, …).
c) Estimation results
The interest rate differential used in the analysis was calculated from
the weekly auctions of 91-day Mexican Cetes and 3-month US Treasury
bills. As noted before, these rates are particularly suitable for our
purposes, because during the sample period they were not central bank
policy instruments, but market-determined variables. The exchange
rate is the weekly average of closing, interbank bid and ask rates. The
inflation rate is the 24 half-month variation in the consumer price
index (CPI) published by Banco de Mexico. Since interest rate
observations are weekly, but the CPI is available only twice a month,
it was necessary to roughly assign one inflation observation to two
interest rate observations. Given that the inflation rate appears to
determine mainly the differential’s long-run level, this does not seem
to pose a serious problem. The real money base index equals the
10 The inflation rate was excluded under the assumption that it does not affect variations in
interest rate differentials in the very short run. This intuition was confirmed in statistical terms:
inclusion of inflation in the estimated ECM yielded very poor results for the entire model.15
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nominal base divided by the product of the consumer price index and
the monthly industrial production index calculated by the National
Institute of Statistics (INEGI).
The sample runs from the last week of June 1996 to the last week
of July 2002. The initial specification had a long lag structure (24
lags), with the purpose of capturing the protracted effects of exchange
rate variations on the interest differential. This initial structure was
simplified according to variations in the Schwarz and Akaike criteria.
In the end, 22 lags were included for each variable.
During the period under analysis, monetary policy in Mexico was
conducted under a system of zero average (over 28-day periods) reserve
requirements for commercial banks (see Yacamán 1999 for a detailed
description). The Banco de Mexico is committed to satisfy whatever
level of reserve demand comes from commercial banks. But the
conditions under which such reserves are created are indicative of the
central bank’s policy stance. In particular, if the Banco de Mexico
announces a so-called “corto”, or shortage of some amount, it means
that such volume of commercial bank reserves will be supplied at
penalty rates. A rise in the “corto” has the purpose of pushing up market
interest rates since it induces banks to compete for funds so as to
avoid the penalization. In fact, it has been documented that such action
does have a very short-run, transitory impact on the Cete interest
rate (see Díaz de León and Greenham, 2000).
Our regression equations include two variables intended to capture
this effect; in particular, tight is a dummy that equals one in the three
weeks following a rise in the short, and zero in the rest, while loose is
equal to one if the observation falls within three weeks after a reduction
in the short, and zero otherwise.11 There is also a dummy that captures
the (immediate) impact of the fall of 1998 financial market turbulence
linked to the Russian debt default; thus, russia equals one during the
first three weeks of September 1998, and zero in the remaining of the
sample.
It can be reasonably assumed that the interest rate differential,
the exchange rate, and the real money supply are affected by common
shocks. Thus, both the cointegration equation and the ECM were
estimated by GMM to allow for the possible endogeneity of the
11 The rationale for introducing these dummies is as in the inclusion of real money: to
isolate the effect of exchange rate variations on interest rate differentials, keeping constant
conditions in the money market.16
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regressors. The presentation of results includes p-values for the J test
of adequacy of instruments and the Q test for serial autocorrelation.
Table 1 shows the main estimation results for Equation 3. All the
coefficients are statistically significant, with the exception of the
intercept and fed; these variables were kept, however, because without
them the model’s statistical performance was negatively affected. The
model passes the tests for absence of serial correlation (up to 36 lags)
and adequacy of instruments. Solving for the cointegration equation,
as in (4), yields:
(6) irdt
c = –48.6077 + 34.0508 russia + 2.2697 tight – 3.6137 loose
+ 42.9631 lns – 13.4167 lnmt + 0.9093 pt + 0.3292 fedt.
Leaving aside the exchange rate, it can be seen that all the
coefficients have the expected sign. Thus, a tighter monetary policy
stance leads to wider interest rate differentials, and the same happens
with a rise in inflation. The size of the coefficients seems plausible.
For example, the long-run effect (i.e., after the dynamic effects have
been worked out) of a 10% rise in the real money base is a 1.3 point
fall in the interest differential; in the same way, a 1 point rise in the
inflation rate leads to a 0.9 rise in the interest rate gap.12
For our purposes, the most important result concerns the exchange
rate coefficient. Its estimated value implies that, holding everything
else constant, a 10% permanent depreciation eventually leads to a 4.3
point rise in the interest rate differential. Thus, we do not find the
negative relationship between the exchange rate and interest rates
frequently assumed in traditional models of monetary policy under a
float.13
As noted above, the short-run deviation from equilibrium is simply
ut = irdt – irdt
c. The Phillips-Perron test statistic for this series (at the
Newey-West suggested truncation lag of 5) is –5.9123 with intercept
and –5.3042 without it, for sample size 319. The augmented Dickey-
Fuller test statistic (including 3 lags, as suggested by the Schwarz
12 The equation intercept implies that when the exchange rate, the real money supply, the
inflation rate and the Federal funds rate are at their mean values (2.1924, 3.5574, 14.3233 and
4.8634, respectively), the interest rate differential’s predicted value (setting all dummies at
zero) is 12.5; its actual sample mean value was 14.7.
13 It should be recalled that this result does not reflect exclusively the very short-run
interest rate-exchange rate nexus, but that it captures the dynamic response incorporating
almost six months of lagged impacts.17
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criterion) is –4.9475 with intercept and –4.3463 without it. In both
cases, the MacKinnon critical values reject the unit root hypothesis at
1%. Thus, the residual-based test suggests that (6) is indeed a
cointegration relation.
The next step was the estimation of the ECM (5), from which to
derive an impulse response function. This was carried out by GMM,
for the same sample running from the last week of June 1996 to the
last week of July 2002. The estimated equation passed the tests for
serial error correlation and instruments adequacy; as must be the
case in the presence of cointegration, the error correction coefficient
(lagged five weeks) was negative and statistically significant.
Figure 2 shows the dynamic response of the interest differential
to a permanent depreciation of the exchange rate. As expected, the
figure shows that in the long run the interest rate differential converges
to a rise of about 4.4 points after a 10% exchange rate rise. Moreover,
it shows that the differential overshoots in the initial months.14 The
14 To check the statistical significance of this response, the ECM was also estimated in a
transformed version similar to equation (3). This made it possible to test for the significance of
the “long-run” or cumulative effects. The p-value for the sum of the auto-regressive coefficients
was 0.0020, and 0.0381 for the sum of exchange rate coefficients.













Q p-values All above 0.10 up to lag 36
Instruments: constant, russia, tight (–1 to –3), loose (–1 to –3), ird (–1 to –23),
lns (–1 to –23), lnm (–1 to –23), inflation (to –23), fed (to –23)







implications from these results were discussed in Section I: the
observed reaction of the interest rate differential to a rise in the
exchange rate may represent a stumbling block for the adoption of an
anti-cyclical monetary policy, and it may also compromise the output
stabilizing properties of the floating regime in the presence of capital
account shocks.
Figure 2. Interest rate differential dynamic response to a 10% currency
depreciation.
III. Explaining the link
This section offers an interpretation of the observed pattern of
interest rate-exchange rate correlations in the Mexican float; the
interpretation focuses on how an inflation-averse central bank may
react to an exogenous currency depreciation, and notes the
implications for the behavior of local interest rates, if private agents
incorporate the central bank reaction function into their expectations
formation process.15
15 The analysis assumes that the central bank reaction function is at least imperfectly
known (and credible) within the private sector.



















The Interest Rate-Exchange Rate Link in the Mexican Float
There is a large body of literature that studies the interest rate-
exchange rate link, with particular emphasis on testing the validity
of the uncovered interest parity condition. A stylized fact from much
of this work is the existence of a negative correlation between current
interest rate differentials and future exchange rate variations, against
what the parity condition would predict.16 Several explanations have
been put forward, including the existence of a time-varying currency
risk premium (for critical assessments, see Takagi 1991 and Svensson
1992), realignment risk in the context of exchange bands (see Bertola
and Svensson 1993), and bandwagon effects in the formation of
expectations (see Takagi 1991).
Related work has advanced the idea that governments typically
show “fear of floating”, in the sense that they use monetary policy to
stabilize exchange rates (see references to work by Calvo, Hausmann
et al. in the introduction). This could produce a positive correlation
between domestic interest rates and the level of the exchange rate. In
fact, McCallum (1994) had argued that the frequently observed
negative association between current interest rate differentials and
next-period exchange rate variations can be rationalized by assuming
the existence of a government policy reaction function, by which local
interest rates are raised in response to a weakening in the currency’s
international value. McCallum (1994) simply assumes that
governments try to smooth exchange rate variations; in what follows,
we will take for granted that there is some degree of pass-through
from the exchange rate to domestic inflation, and that inflation-averse
authorities may thus respond to a rise in the exchange rate by
tightening monetary policy.17
A formal exposition of the problem is as follows. By definition,
the proportional change in the real exchange rate (defined as the
ratio of foreign to local prices, in local currency) is equal to the
proportional change in the nominal exchange rate minus the
domestic inflation rate (assuming for simplicity that foreign
16 See Froot and Thaler (1990) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for an overview. Nakagawa
(2002) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2001) show that the so-called forward premium puzzle may
reflect the presence of nonlinearities in the relationship between exchange and interest rates,
while Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) argue that in fact no such puzzle can be detected in the data
for developing countries.
17 Clarida (2001) summarizes recent empirical work showing that the central bank, in a
number of developed countries, incorporates the exchange rate in its policy reaction function.
Eichengreen (2001) argues that inflation-targeting central banks will react by tightening policy
after the local currency depreciates as a result of capital account shocks.20
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inflation is zero): dlnq / dt = dlns / dt – p, where q is the real
exchange rate, and as before ln denotes the natural logarithm. How
the change in the nominal exchange rate is determined is a matter
of dispute in the literature. For our purposes, it seems safe to posit
that it is determined by a combination of fundamentals (represented
by the inflation rate) and monetary factors (summarized by the
interest rate): dlns/dt = sp – mi, where s and m are positive
coefficients. To the extent that the rate does not fully reflect
fundamentals (or because for a country like Mexico there may be a
Balassa-Samuelson effect), s will be less than one. If the inflation
rate depends negatively on the interest rate and positively on the
real exchange rate, the change in the real exchange rate will be
given by:
(7) dlnq/dt = – mi – (1 – s) p (q, i).
(+, –)
After equalizing to zero, Equation (7) defines a downward sloping
schedule of stationary q values in the (q, i) space. It is easy to see that
the real exchange rate has stable dynamics in the sense that, starting
from stationarity, an exogenous rise in the interest rate and/or the
exchange rate will lead to a negative rate of change of q.
We will conventionally assume that the central bank attempts to
minimize a weighted sum of output and inflation deviations from
target:
(8) min L = ½ [y 2 + t (p - pT)2]
where t reflects the strength of inflation aversion and for notation
simplicity the output target is set at zero (Martínez et al., 2001, present
evidence supporting this sort of reaction function for the Banco de
Mexico, at least since November 1998).18
18 This formulation is now standard in the analysis of monetary policy rules among developed
countries (see Taylor 1999). For supporting evidence in the case of Latin America, see Corbo
(2000). Recently, a difference has been made between countries following strict inflation targeting,
where output (or the output gap, or unemployment) does not enter the central bank policy
function, and in cases of flexible targeting, where it does. According to the results in Martínez
et al. (2001), Mexico would belong to the latter category at least since late 1998. But it is important
to note that the conclusions derived below regarding the interest rate-exchange rate link do not
depend on including output in the government’s loss function. Even if they were strict targeters,
the authorities would react to a currency depreciation by tightening monetary policy, thus
producing the positive correlation discussed in the text.21
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To solve the problem, let us postulate linear functions for output:
y=y 0 + yqq + yii, the real exchange rate: q = q0 + qii, the interest rate:
i=i 0 + imm, and the inflation rate: p = p0 + pqq + pii. Output is assumed
to depend negatively on the interest rate, but the effect of variations
in the real exchange rate is uncertain: a rise in q improves the trade
balance, thus raising aggregate demand, but it also has income-
distribution and balance-sheet effects operating in the opposite
direction (see, e.g., Ocampo 2000). Following the previous discussion,
the real exchange rate is taken to be a negative function of the interest
rate; we leave aside considerations of dynamic adjustment for
simplicity. The interest rate is posited to have a market component
(i0), reflecting portfolio preferences, expectations, etc., and a policy
component. If, for instance, the central bank uses the money base as
its instrument (m), then im<0 .
The inflation rate is assumed to depend negatively on the interest
rate and positively on the real exchange rate. The former effect simply
reflects the idea that a rise in the interest rate is disinflationary
because it reduces aggregate demand and, thus, upward price pressures
in the labor and goods markets; naturally, the inflation rate may in
turn affect the interest rate through the market component i0, but
such complication is not further considered here. The second
determinant of inflation may require some elaboration. Calvo (1997),
among others, has called attention to the existence of a strong negative
link between the inflation rate and the level of the real exchange rate
in Mexico. This nexus is a critical factor in the present analysis. In
particular, if an exogenous rise in the exchange rate only led to a higher
price level, but without affecting the inflation rate, then inflation-averse
authorities would not assume a tighter policy stance (except in the
unlikely case that they were targeting the price level, and not the
inflation rate).
Returning to the government’s loss function, we can set dL/dm = 0
and find that the policy rule is:
(9) m = { t (p*–P) Pm – OYm} / {(Ym)2 + t (Pm)2}
where P = p0 + pq(q0 + qii0) + pii0, Pm = im (pqqi + pi), O = y0 + yq (q0 + i0qi) +
i0yi, and Ym = im (yqqi + yi). Ym measures the output response to a monetary
expansion; it will be positive, unless the possibly negative effect of the real
exchange rate on output is very strong. Pm measures the overall impact of
a monetary expansion on the inflation rate and it is, of course, positive.22
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Consider now the effect of a capital account shock, for instance in
an exogenous fall in the world demand for domestic assets. This will
appear as an exogenous rise in the rates of interest and exchange. The
rise in q0 and i0 will increase the inflation rate (unless there is a strong
disinflationary effect from the higher interest rate, captured by the
third element in P). The output effect is likely to be contractionary,
unless a currency depreciation is strongly expansionary. As Equation
(9) shows, in this situation the central bank faces a dilemma arising
from the simultaneous rise in P (which calls for monetary contraction)
and fall in O (which calls for the opposite response). A tightening will
be the likely course of action to the extent that authorities are strongly
anti-inflationary (high t).
The policy dilemma can be better understood with the help of Figure
3. The figure shows a negatively sloped schedule for the determination
of the real exchange rate in the (q, i) space. There is also a yT schedule
along which output is kept as a target; the schedule slopes downward
under the assumption that a currency depreciation is contractionary:
the fall in output associated with an interest rate rise has to be offset
by a real exchange rate appreciation. The output schedule is steeper
under the assumption that, after taking into account the effect of an
interest rate rise on the real exchange rate, the net output effect is
contractionary. The target inflation rate schedule is positively sloped
as the inflationary impact of a real currency depreciation has to be
offset by a tighter monetary policy stance.
The real exchange rate schedule shifts out as a consequence of the
posited capital account shock. At the same time, the market interest
rate rises. If, as seems plausible, the shock results in higher inflation
and lower output, the economy will move to a position along the 1-2
segment of the q schedule. The authorities may respond with a
monetary expansion, pushing the economy toward point 3, or they
may instead adopt a more restrictive policy stance, moving toward
point 2. In the first case, output is protected at the cost of higher
inflation, whereas in the second the authorities are inclined to stick
with the inflation target and are willing to sacrifice output. The actual
choice will depend on policy preferences, as shown by the role of
parameter t in our previous discussion. But the policy response may
also be conditioned by the behavior of private expectations.
To see this, first note that if the authorities choose to move toward
point 3 by adopting a looser policy stance, and if they are successful in
raising the real exchange rate, this implies that there will be a rise in23
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Figure 3. Output and inflation targets under contractionary
depreciation.
the rate of nominal currency depreciation (given that the inflation
rate will be increasing). But the higher depreciation rate will take
place in a context of falling interest rates. Both factors tend to depress
the return on peso investments, as shown by Equation (1). If private
agents are able to foresee this path, they will reduce their demand for
peso assets as they try to shift to dollar assets. This fall in the demand
for peso assets will make it difficult to follow an anti-cyclical policy. In
contrast, choosing a tighter policy stance after the capital account shock
will yield a declining rate of currency depreciation together with higher
interest rates. This combination will tend to stabilize the demand for
peso assets, which may be particularly important in the aftermath of
the shock (a point stressed by Carstens and Werner 1999, pp. 44, 47).
Perhaps it is important to clarify that this result does not depend
on the assumption that a currency depreciation has a negative output
effect, but only that output falls after a negative capital account shock













fall in foreign investment). Figure 4 illustrates the point. In the figure
it is assumed that inflation is relatively more sensitive than output to
variations in the real exchange rate, in the sense that after q rises,
returning to target inflation requires a larger interest rate increase
than returning to target output. If the capital account shock is
contractionary, the economy will shift to a point along the 1-2 segment.
There is thus again a policy dilemma.
The preceding discussion stresses the point that, if the central
bank behaves in anti-inflationary fashion after an exogenous decline
in the currency’s value, then interest rates will increase for some time.
But in addition there may be a more immediate effect through
variations in private expectations. In particular, if private agents
believe that the central bank will adopt tighter policies in the near
future, then standard term structure theory predicts that current
interest rates (except those for very short-term instruments) will start
moving upward (even if the uncovered interest parity condition holds;
see Ibarra 2002). This is a channel that may be of importance in the
Mexican case, given that the Cete rate has not been a central bank
instrument during the float.
IV. Conclusions
The possibility of having an autonomous monetary policy under
conditions of high international mobility of capital, and the output
stabilizing properties of a floating currency regime, depend on the
way interest rate differentials react to exogenous variations in the
exchange rate. An adverse capital account shock, for instance an
exogenous fall in the world demand for local assets, besides having a
negative output effect, reduces the local currency’s international value.
If the latter leads to a decline in the expected depreciation rate for
some future date, then current interest rates (aside from those on
very short-term instruments) will tend to fall. This interest rate
adjustment would be an automatic output stabilizer embedded in the
floating regime. Even more, the negative correlation between the
current exchange rate and the interest differential would give the
central bank the leeway to assume a clear anti-cyclical policy stance.
In this paper we have estimated, from an ECM, the dynamic
response of the interest rate gap between Mexican and US Treasury
bills to a permanent variation in the exchange rate, using data from25
The Interest Rate-Exchange Rate Link in the Mexican Float
the current period of peso floating. The results indicate that, even
considering a long lag structure, a weakening in today’s exchange rate
leads to a protracted increase in the interest rate differential. This
stands in contrast to an assumption commonly found in policy-oriented
macroeconomic models, and has potentially important implications.
In particular, given the discussion summarized in the previous
paragraph, the observed dynamic reaction of the peso interest rate
represents a stumbling block for the conduct of an anti-cyclical
monetary policy and compromises the output stabilizing properties of
the floating currency regime in the presence of capital account shocks.
It could be considered whether the results obtained are biased
by the single-equation estimation approach that has been followed.
As is well known, VARs are widely used in the field. However, in the
present context a VAR methodology was unattractive given the
purpose of studying the dynamic response of the interest differential
to an exchange rate change holding the rest as a constant, in










Figure 4. Output and inflation targets under expansionary
depreciation.26
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not to study how the interest rate-exchange rate link evolves as a
result of policy actions, but rather to analyze how private expectations
(and perhaps risk assessments) change following an exchange rate
variation.
The last section of the paper offers an initial formal exploration of
the possibility that the dynamic response of the interest rate
differential reflects private anticipations of future monetary policy
actions, à la McCallum (1994). The basic idea is that if the central
bank exhibits inflation aversion, and there is a positive relation
between the exchange rate and the inflation rate, then agents may
expect a policy tightening in the aftermath of an exogenous exchange
rate depreciation. According to conventional term structure theory,
this sole anticipation would tend to raise current and future interest
rates, even if no central bank action actually takes place. Even more,
it is also noted that if the central bank were to choose an alternative
course of action, then there could be destabilizing effects on the assets
market, given the concurrence of expectations of currency depreciation
and falling interest rates.
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